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Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement of
U.S. Sugar Imports from Mexico
Stephen Devadoss,  Jurgen Kropf, and Thomas Wahl
A world  sugar model consisting of 21  countries was developed to determine  the effects of
NAFTA of U.S. and Mexican sugar markets and to quantify the trade creation and diversion
effects on U.S. imports  from Mexico.  Mexican sugar production  increases  under NAFTA,
causing Mexico  to  become a net exporter.  NAFTA induces sugar imports  from Mexico to
displace  U.S. production,  to meet demand expansion,  and also to divert U.S.  imports from
other foreign  suppliers  to Mexico.  Effects of NAFTA on the U.S. sugar market are  small
because  of the  side  agreements  which  limit  Mexican  exports  and  which  include  corn
sweetener consumption  when computing Mexico's production surplus.
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Introduction
One of the agricultural  issues  hotly debated during the negotiation  and ratification of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the effect of  NAFTA on the U.S. sugar
industry because  sugar policies were one of the most sensitive and complicated agricultural
policies negotiated  under  NAFTA.  There  were  conflicting predictions  whether  NAFTA
would benefit or hurt the sugar industry in the United States. For example, Daniel Sumner,
who at the time was assistant secretary of agriculture for economics at U.S. Department of
Agriculture,  elaborated  "NAFTA  promises  positive  gains"  for  the  U.S.  sugar  industry
because: (a)  access to the Mexican market will improve; (b) U.S. production is more efficient
than that of Mexico; and (c) higher income growth in Mexico resulting from NAFTA will
stimulate consumption of sugar.
However, opponents of NAFTA suggested that the U.S.  sugar industry is likely to lose.
For example, Markwart, executive vice president of American Sugarbeet Growers Associa-
tion, (p.  2)  argued that NAFTA is "a blueprint for disaster for the U.S. sugar program  and
for the devastation of our domestic sugar industry." In support of his conclusion, Markwart
reasons,  (a) by creating  a  free trade zone,  Mexico  will become more cost competitive  in
sugar production because of the availability of better technology, new investments,  and a
lower wage structure; (b) NAFTA will cause an increase in sugar prices which will decrease
the  demand for sugar  in Mexico  and make more sugar available  for export to the United
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States;  and (c)  the establishment of a corn sweetener  market and the substitution  of high
fructose corn syrup (HFCS) for sugar in Mexico will decrease Mexican sugar consumption
and  increase  the amount  of raw  sugar available  for  export to the United  States.  Similar
conclusions were also reached by Fleming (p. 22) who noted that the use of HFCS will cause
Mexico to switch from net importing to exporting status, "thereby  impairing the ability of
the U.S. government to operate the sugar program ....
NAFTA  became  effective  I  January  1994.  As  NAFTA  is  being  implemented,  it  is
important, given the significance  of the sugar  industry, to predict the  potential effects  of
sugar trade reforms on production,  consumption, and prices and the resulting implications
for  U.S.  sugar imports  from  Mexico and other countries.  This article uses the theoretical
analysis of economic integration to quantify the impacts of NAFTA on the U.S. and Mexican
sugar markets. NAFTA sugar trade reforms present an ideal case for examining trade creation
(TC)  and  trade diversion  (TD) effects because  U.S. imports  from Mexico  could displace
domestic production, meet increases  in demand (TC),  and also replace  imports from other
foreign suppliers (TD).  The objective of this study is accomplished  by estimating a world
sugar trade model  consisting of 21  countries/regions.  For each country,  important compo-
nents of supply and demand are estimated by incorporating domestic and trade  policies and
modeling  sugar substitutes.
NAFTA Policy  Provisions
The following NAFTA policy provisions include the side agreements negotiated in Novem-
ber  1993.  The primary  source  of these policies  is the USDA (1992).  NAFTA  sugar trade
reforms have a  15-year transition period.
1.  In the first six years, Mexico's sugar exports to the United States will be restricted to
7,528  metric tons (MT).  However, if Mexico becomes a net exporter in any of these
six years, it will  be given access to the U.S. market for its net exportable surplus up
to 25,000 MT.
2.  After the first six years, Mexico can export up to a maximum of 250,000 MT of its
net exportable surplus to the United States. Mexico will not have unlimited access to
the U.S. market as in the original negotiation. Corn sweetener will be included on the
consumption side in computing Mexico's production surplus.
3.  In the first six years, the United States will reduce its second tier tariff on sugar imports
from Mexico by  15%.
4.  By year  seven,  Mexico will  align  its tariff and tariff-quota  rates with those of the
United States.  In the remaining years,  the U.S. and Mexican tariffs on bilateral trade
will be phased out linearly.
5.  If increased imports from Mexico affect the U.S. price support program, imports from
other countries will be reduced.
6.  The U.S. sugar reexport program will remain in place for exports to Mexico, but U.S.
shipments will be subject to Mexico's most favored nation (MFN) tariff rate.
7.  Canada and Mexico will preserve their tariffs on bilateral trade in sugar.
The  policy  parameters  are  incorporated  in  the  simulation  to  analyze  the  effects  of
NAFTA, trade creation, and trade diversion.
2However, the side agreement negotiated  in November  1993  includes corn sweetener on the consumption side in computing
Mexico's production surplus.  This side agreement should reduce Mexico's production surplus and, thus, the amount available
for export to  the United States.
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Theoretical Analysis  of Trade Creation and Diversion
Economic  integration  due to forming  regional  free trade zone  induces  trade creation  and
diversion,  which will lead to resource reallocations.  TC occurs  as imports from a member
country  resulting  from  eliminating trade  barriers  displace  domestic  production  and meet
demand expansion,  and TD occurs when goods imported from a member country  replaces
imports  from  nonmember  countries (Wilford).  Although  TC  and TD are  studied  under a
static  framework,  the  long-run  effects  of economic  integration  can  arise  from  efficient
reallocation  of resources,  specializations,  structural  changes,  and economic growth.  (Ger-
nant; Wilford). However, studies have analyzed the effects of  regional free trade over a period
on the volume of trade creation and diversion only for a particular good (see, for example,
Pelzman). Our study, along the line of Pelzman, examines  the trade creation and diversion
effects of NAFTA on the U.S. sugar market.
In  figure  1, panel  A depicts  the U.S.  domestic  market  with supply (Sus) and demand
(D,,)  .3 Panel B depicts the international  market facing the United  States. Considering the
United States as a large importer of sugar,4 a positively sloped excess supply for the rest of
the  world  (ESRow)  is  drawn.  A positively  sloped  Mexican  excess  supply  of sugar
(ESMEX)  is drawn above the  ESROW indicating that Mexico  is a relatively  less-efficient and
higher-cost  sugar  producer  than  the other exporting  countries.  A negatively  sloped  U.S.
excess demand curve  (EDu,,), which is the difference between domestic demand and supply,
is also drawn.
The U.S. implements a tariff-rate quota system to restrict sugar imports. In this theoretical
discussion, we consider,  for expositional  convenience, an import tariff to illustrate the TC
and TD concepts.  Suppose the United States imposes an import tariff equal to $t per ton of
sugar imports.  In response to this tariff, the excess demand will shift down to EDuS because
the tariff adds  additional  cost to  sugar  imports,  and thus,  importers  demand  less of the
imported sugar.  With the tariff level of $t, imports are  restricted to the amount ab in panel
A or a'b' in panel B. The domestic market price in the United States is the world price plus
the tariff (PI  + t).  This higher domestic price helps to maintain the domestic price support
to  producers.  The  tariff revenue  accruing  from  this  import  tariff policy  is  the  shaded
rectangular  area in panel  A. From panel B,  since ESMEX  intersects the vertical  axis at  Pw,,6
all the U.S. imports come from the rest of the world (ROW) and none from Mexico because
Mexico is a relatively  high-cost supplier of sugar compared  to other exporting countries.7
Next, TC and TD of U.S. sugar imports from ROW to Mexico are discussed in figure 2.
NAFTA will phase  out the tariff on Mexican sugar exports to the United  States.  The free
trade  agreement between  the United  States and Mexico,  coupled with U.S. restrictions on
imports from other countries,  will give Mexico preferential access to the U.S.  market with
lower  trade  barriers  during  the  transition  period  and,  eventually,  free  access  after  the
3The following analysis abstracts from transportation costs  for expositional  convenience.
4Houck presents a model  for analyzing trade preference using a small importing country assumption.
5The rest  of the world does not  include Mexico. For ease of theoretical exposition,  other exporting and importing countries
are aggregated as the rest of the world (ROW)  and the ensuing analysis  is carried out in a three-country  (the United  States,
Mexico, and ROW)  framework.  However  in the empirical section, a detailed country-level  disaggregation  is presented  and
analysis is conducted  in a 21-country  fiamework  including all major exporters and importers.
6It should be noted that at Pw Mexico neither exports to the United States nor imports fi'om ROW.  However, Mexico would
be a net exporter of sugar at free-trade  world price, which is consistent with the sugar market conditions because Mexico was
an exporter  in the  1960s, 1970s, and some years in the  1980s.
We thank  an anonymous  reviewer for helpful comments on  figures  1, 2, and 3 in an earlier version of this article.
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Figure 1. Graphical illustration of sugar trade
transition period. To ease the theoretical expositions, the following analysis is conducted by
assuming that Mexico has free access to the U.S. market. Thus, as in figure 2 which depicts
the U.S. domestic market, the total sugar supply in the United States is its domestic supply
(Sus)  plus  the  export  supply  from Mexico  (ESMEX).  Since  the United  States  is a large
importing  country,  free entry of Mexico's  sugar,  in lieu of ROW's sugar, will depress the
world price because  it will shift the U.S.  import demand curve downward and to the left.
This results in the new world price  P,, < P  and also P, + t < P,, + t. The price decline from
P ,a  to  P,  causes U.S. production to decrease.  If imports from Mexico are equal to decreases
in  U.S. production (not depicted in fig. 2), the displacement of U.S. production by imports
from Mexico is called trade creation.  Furthermore, as prices decrease,  demand in the United
States increases, which will lead to an increase in total imports (that is, imports from ROW
and Mexico).
If imports from Mexico are greater than th  te decrease in U.S. production,  as depicted in
figure  2, then both TC  and TD will  occur. At P  + t  in figure 2, the  quantity of domestic
supply is equal to cd, imports from Mexico are equal to df,  and imports from ROW are equal
to fh. The displacement of U.S. production by imports from Mexico is trade creation, which
is  equal  to de.  In  addition,  imports  from  ROW  at  P,, + t  (equal  to fh) are  less  than the
pre-NAFTA  imports of ab, and trade diversion  equal  to ab - fi  (or equally  ef - gh)  will
occur.  Because of the free access  of Mexico's  sugar exports to the United  States, ef - gh
amount of sugar that could be imported from ROW is diverted to Mexico. If Mexican exports
to  the United  States  are  relatively high,  then TD  will  occur because  one  of the NAFTA
provisions  specifically  states  that if increased  imports  from Mexico  affect the U.S. price
support program,  imports  from other countries will be reduced. Furthermore,  expansion  in
demand  at P.  + t  is met by  imports equal to gh, which is also TC. In sum,  TC is equal to
de + gh and TD is equal to ef - gh. U.S. producers will lose and consumers will gain to the
extent domestic  price declines from P,, + t to P^. + t.
Markwart  argues  that NAFTA provides  Mexico  with access  to  improved  technology,
lower-priced  inputs, and  new  investments  and will  allow Mexico  to substitute  HFCS  for
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Figure 2.  Trade creation and diversion  Figure 3.  Trade creation and diversion
Note:  de +  gh = amount of trade creation  Note:  nq +  rv = amount of trade creation
ef- gh = amount of trade diversion  qr = amount of trade diversion
sugar, which will cause Mexico to become a permanent net exporter of sugar to the United
States  and lead to  a significant  decrease  in U.S.  sugar production.  If such an  increase  in
Mexico's exports to the United  States occurs, Mexico's excess supply in figure 2 will shift
further down, and  PJ,  and  P,F,  + t will continue to decline.  During this process both TC and
TD will occur.
Continued  increase in Mexico's exports will cause ESMrx to shift down towards a point
such as v in figure 3, where  Sys + ESMF  intersects  D,  at which there would be no imports
from ROW and price declines will end. At v, imports from ROW are completely replaced
by  imports  from  Mexico  and  TD  from  ROW to  Mexico  is  said  to  be complete.  As a
consequence of complete TD, ROW is totally shut out and Mexico's exports to the United
States are equal to nv. Thus, the total sugar supply in the United States is equal  to inn from
the domestic market and nv from Mexico.  Because of the price decline,  the new  domestic
price P in figure 3 is less than the price P,,  + t in figure 2. Consequently,  domestic production
falls from point a to n on the U.S. supply curve and demand increases from point b to v on
the demand curve.  The total TD equals ab (= qr) and TC equals nq + rv. The two shaded
triangles in figure 3 measure social gains as a result of these TD and TC processes. The area
naq represents an increase in production or technical efficiency as resources are moved from
less efficient sugar production to other more productive uses. The area rbv measures the gain
in consumer surplus as U.S. consumers are able to consume more  at a lower price.
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World Sugar Trade Model
This section describes the structure of a nonspatial equilibrium world sugar trade model and
provides detailed information about data, country coverage, and model estimation. The basic
elements  of such a model  in a partial equilibrium framework are illustrated graphically  in
figure 4. The U.S. excess demand curve (EDLS)  is the difference between domestic demand
(Dus)  and  supply  (S,,s)  and  represents  the  quantity  of imports  at various  price  levels
demanded from the world market. Exporters' supply and demand schedules are given in the
lower panel. The curve EST is the combined excess  supply of all the exporters, which  is the
difference  between  the supply and demand of all the exporters.  The excess  demand curve
(EDO) of all other importers  is the difference between their total demand and total  supply.
Exporters' export supply (EST) and importers'  import demand (EDO)  are represented  in the
top panel under the title "Foreign Trade." The excess supply curve (ESN) facing the U.S. is
the  difference  between  the export  supply  (EST) of all  exporters  and  the import  demand
(EDO) of all other importers. A trade equilibrium is achieved by equating excess demand of
the United States to the net excess supply of  all other countries, which also equates the excess
demands and supplies generated from all the countries. This graphical analysis is illustrated
using a free  trade framework  for ease of exposition.  However,  the world sugar market  is
hardly a free trade market. The theoretical and empirical model presented below incorporates
the important features  of domestic and trade policies  of major exporters and importers.
Theoretical  Model
The algebraic  formulations of the necessary components of the world sugar trade model are
described here.
Exporters. The domestic  demand  for sugar in the ith (i = 1..., n)  exporting  country  is
specified as:
(1)  SUDo, = D,i(S,  Pi,  ZP, X,  ).
Domestic demand for sugar (SUD,) is determined by own price (SPI),  income (YK),  substitute
price  (ZIP)  such as HFCS price, and a vector of country-specific  demand shifters (X, )  that
explain food use. Thus, the theoretical specification for demand is based on consumer theory.
The domestic stock demand  for sugar in the ith exporting country  is specified as:
(2)  SUSD, = SD, (SPJ,  SUPD, GP, X2 ).
The behavioral relationship of stock demand  (SUSD,)  reflects speculative  and transactive
motives of inventory demand. The stock demand is determined by own price (StP),  current
production  (SUPD 1),  government  stock  policies  (GPi),  and  a  vector  of shift  variables
(x2).
Domestic supply is determined by estimating acreage functions. The acreage function in
the ith exporting country  is specified as:
SUAC, = AC,(SP,, LSPI,  GSP,, CP,, X3i).
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The acreage (SUA C,)  is determined by current price (SPj), lagged price (LSJP), government
price supports (GSIP), competing crop prices (CPI), and a vector of country-specific  supply
shifters (X 3 ,).
Sugar supply in the ith exporting country (SUSY1)  is yield (SUYDi)  times acreage times
extraction rate (ERj)  plus beginning stocks (SUSDi,,_ ). Thus,
(4)  SUSYj  = SUAC i SUYDO  ERi + SUSDil_.
The excess supply of sugar by the ith exporting country is the sum of domestic supply
minus domestic demand. Thus, the export supply (SUES,) is given as:
(5)  SUES, = SUSY  - SUD, - SUSD,.
If an exporting country pursues border intervention policies such as export subsidies to
increase its exports, then an export supply function is explicitly estimated. The total export
supply of all the exporters (SUEST) is the sum of each country's export supply:
(6)  SUEST =  SUES,.
i=I
This function  is comparable to the EST curve in figure 4.
Importers. Them(j = 1,..., m) importing countries  include  the United States.  The nota-
tions used for describing  the supply and demand  functions of the exporting  countries can
also  be used  for the  importing  countries with two modifications.  First, the subscript i is
changed toj to denote the importing country.  Second, the m number of importing countries
is divided into m - I other importers and the United States as shown in figure 4. The subscript
j  denotes the  m - 1 countries and u represents the United  States. With these  modifications
the  sugar  excess  demand  by  the jth  importing  country  (SUED,)  and  the United  States
(SUED,,)  is given by:
(7)  SUED  = SUD, + SUSD, -SUSYi,  and
(8)  SUED, = SUD, + SUSD, - SUSY,.
As with the  exporting  countries,  if an importing  country pursues  border  intervention
policies such as quotas and tariffs, then an import demand function is explicitly estimated.
The sum of excess demands of the other m - I importers is
n-l
(9)  SUEDO=  SUED,.
j=1
This function  is comparable to the EDO curve in figure 4.
The net excess demand (SUESN) facing the United States is the difference  between the
excess supply of exporters  minus excess demand of the other importers:
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(10)  SUESN= SUEST-  SUEDO.
This function  is comparable to the ESN curve in figure 4.
The world market equilibrium for sugar is determined by equating the excess demand of
the United States to the net excess  supply of all other countries.  Thus,
( 11)  SUHED, = SUESN.
This world market equilibrium corresponds  to point A  in figure 4.
Price  linkage equations are specified to account  for the transportation costs,  exchange
rate differences  between  countries,  and trade policies.  The price linkage equations  for the
importing and exporting countries and the United States are
(12)  SP = SP(  WSP e  Z,)  i =...,n,
(13)  SP.=SPj(WSPejZi)  j=l,...,m-1,
(14)  SP, = SP,( WSP, Z  ),
where WSP is the world sugar price, e, is the exchange rate between country i and the currency
(dollar) used to represent the world price.  The vectors Z, represent transportation costs and
trade policies such as import tariffs,  quotas, and export subsidies.
Because of the growing  importance  of HFCS  in  the caloric  sweetener  industry,  the
HFCS market is also explicitly modeled.
Empirical  Model
The model consists of 21  countries/regions.  The exporting countries/regions  included in the
model are Australia,  Brazil, Cuba, the European Union, India, South Africa, Thailand, other
Central America, and other South America. The importing countries/regions  are the United
States, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Indonesia, China, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
other Western  Europe, other Asia, other Africa, and ROW. The high disaggregation allows
the market structure of most of the countries/regions participating in the world sugar market
to be adequately captured.
This large-scale model allows incorporating the influence of domestic and trade policies
on  production,  consumption,  stocks,  and  trade.  Furthermore,  incorporating  government
intervention  policies  allows accurate  capturing  of the effects of trade  liberalization.  The
model  includes the dynamic behavior of the sugar market,  which captures the adjustments
in the  endogenous  variables  over time  in response  to policy  changes.  The  influence  of
macroeconomic  variables (exchange rates, interest rates, inflation rates, and GNP) and time
lags in production are also explicitly modeled.
Data for production, consumption, exports, imports, and ending stocks are obtained from
the Economic Research Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service of  the U. S. Department
of Agriculture.  Data  for area harvested,  yield,  and extraction rates are obtained  from the
XWe acknowledge Ron Lord of the  IEconomic  Research Service of the U.S. Department  of Agriculture  for providing some of
the data and sources for additional  variables.
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Food and Agricultural Organization of  the United Nations (FAO). Macroeconomic data such
as income, population,  and exchange and inflation rates are obtained from the International
Monetary  Fund (IMF). The estimation period includes the years  1970 to  1992.
For each country, functional relationships for supply and demand components and price
linkage equations are estimated. The estimation of the supply side consists of sugarcane or
sugarbeet area planted and a total sugar production equation which is the product of the area
planted, the extraction  rate, and the yield. For some countries, the supply side also includes
the estimation of sugar imports. The estimation of the demand components consists of sugar
consumption and ending stocks. For some countries, sugar exports are also estimated. The
price  linkage  equation  links  the  domestic  price  to  the  world price.  As  specified  in the
theoretical model, for each country net excess demand or excess  supply is derived and the
world  market  equilibrium  is  established  by  equating  the  net  import  demand  of all  the
importers and net export supply of all the exporters.
Since the model  incorporates considerable  details such as country-level disaggregation,
HFCS  sector,  domestic  and  trade  policies,  macroeconomic  factors,  and  unique  charac-
teristics  of beet and cane  production,  a rigorous  analysis can  be conducted  to accurately
estimate the effects of NAFTA trade liberalizations.
The model includes a total of 82 endogenous equations and 21 market-clearing equations,
which determine  103 endogenous  variables  and use 205 exogenous  variables.  Both linear
and nonlinear techniques are used in estimating the endogenous equations. The values of R
for various equations and the simulation results indicate that the model is suitable for policy
analysis.  Because  of the  space  limitations,  the  complete  empirical  model  could  not be
included  in  the  text.  However,  readers  interested  in the  modeling  approach,  estimated
equations, structural coefficients, elasticities, and simulation analysis are referred to Kropf.
We report the estimated  supply and demand  elasticities for various countries in table 1,
which represent behavioral relationships  in the model, and compare the elasticity estimates
with those  from past literature.  The estimated own-price  supply elasticity for sugarbeet  in
the United States is 0.215 and cross-price (wheat price) elasticity is -0.077.  The own-price
beet  supply  elasticity  is  comparable  with  the estimates  reported  by  Lopez  at  0.246 and
Vroomen at 0.280 (also, see Messina and  Seale). Haley, Vivien,  and Sigua estimated beet
supply  elasticities  for various  regions  of the United  States,  ranging  from  0.02  to  1.51.
Sudaryanto's estimate  for an earlier period is  0.70. The estimated  own-price elasticity  for
cane in the United  States is 0.054,  cross-price  (cotton price)  elasticity  is -0.05  and input
price  elasticity  is  -0.046.  The  own-price  cane  elasticity  is very inelastic  because of the
ratooning practices for sugarcane, which limits the acreage adjustment to price changes. This
inelastic estimate  is comparable with the elasticity reported by Lopez at 0.103,  Vroomen at
0.135, Leong at 0.16, and Sudaryanto at 0.17. Haley, Vivien, and Sigua estimated cane supply
elasticity for four states (Florida, Hawaii,  Louisiana, and Texas), which range from 0.04 to
0.62.  Wong,  Sturgiss, and  Borrell  estimated  an aggregate  U.S.  sugar supply  elasticity  at
0.221.  The estimated own-price  consumption  elasticity is  -0.042  and income elasticity  is
0.254.  The  own-price  elasticity  estimate  is  very  similar  to  the ones  reported  by  Wong,
Sturgiss,  and  Borrell  at  -0.048,  Vroomen  at  -0.114,  and  Lopez  at  -0.141.  The  income
elasticity estimate  is comparable  to that of Wong, Sturgiss, and Borrel's 0.287.
Empirical Results
In this section, details about baseline and NAFTA projections and impacts, particularly  as
they relate to trade creation and diversion, are presented. To examine the effects of NAFTA,
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Table 1.  Estimated Supply and Demand Elasticities from the World Sugar Trade Model
Supply  Elasticities  Demand Elasticities
Consumption  Stocks
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"The cross prices  include wheat for U.S. beet, cotton for U.S. cane, wheat for Australia  and Canada, and ethanol
for Brazil.
a baseline  scenario  is  run to project the endogenous  variables  over the period of 1994 to
2007  by  using the forecast  values  of the exogenous  variables.  The  forecast values of the
exogenous variables are derived from various sources:  GDP, GDP deflator,  exchange rates,
commodity  production,  and  prices  are  obtained  from  the  Food  and  Agricultural  Policy
Research Institute (FAPRI). Population forecasts are obtained from the USDA (1993). Crude
oil prices and  coffee  prices  come from  a World  Bank report.  The baseline  values of the
endogenous variables serve as a benchmark to measure the effects of  the trade liberalization. 9
NAFTA will  have general  effects on the economies  of the United States, Mexico,  and
Canada,  which will also have impacts on the sugar markets.  Some of these impacts include
changes  in income,  technology,  input prices, and the availability of HFCS in Mexico.  The
9This baseline  scenario includes the Uruguay Round  (UR) policy parameters. Since these UR provisions will be followed by
the GATT member countries,  inclusion of the UR parameters in the baseline will  help to isolate  the effects of NAFTA.
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policy provisions negotiated under NAFTA along with the assumptions  of these variables
are incorporated  into the world sugar trade model, and the NAFTA scenario is run for the
period of 1994 to 2007. The NAFTA analysis predicts the effects on U.S. cane and beet area,
sugar production,  consumption,  stocks, imports, and HFCS production  and consumption;
on Mexico's sugar production, consumption, stocks, and trade; and on major exporters' and
importers' supply and demand components  (some of these results are reported  in table 2).
In the interest of brevity, however, we focus our discussion on the trade creation and diversion
effects of NAFTA by supplementing the discussion with the results of supply and demand
changes  in the United States and Mexico. The theoretical model explained earlier presents
the trade creation and diversion effects in a static framework. However, the empirical model
is capable of analyzing these effects in a dynamic framework, and thus, the results presented
below examine these effects over the NAFTA transition period.
NAFTA's most significant effect on the sugar market  is the increase  in Mexican  sugar
production  by  an average  of about  11.4%  per year  over the  baseline productions.  This
increase  is  caused by Mexico's  opportunity  to import  improved  U.S.  technology,  lower-
priced inputs such as fertilizer, and the increased  availability of U.S. capital to modernize
Mexican production facilities. The increase in sugar production ranges between 1.6 and 8.4%
during the first six years of NAFTA and reaches between 12.3 and 20.7% after the year 2000
when Mexican sugar production becomes more efficient. The effect on sugar consumption
in Mexico  is relatively  small although  the total caloric  sweetener  consumption  increases
significantly.  This result occurs because  with the increased availability of HFCS  from the
U.S. market HFCS is substituted for sugar.
Since sugar production increases surpass consumption  increases, the world sugar price
experiences very slight decreases, an average of 0.2 cents per pound below baseline values.
Consequences of these production and consumption  changes are that Mexico  increases its
total sugar exports and  switches  from net  importer to net exporter status  in  1995  even if
HFCS is included in the demand side in the calculation of the net exportable surplus.
Mexico increases its total sugar exports by an average of 138,000 MT per year over the
baseline export levels. After becoming a net sugar exporter, Mexico can export its surplus
to the United States up to the amount allowed under NAFTA which invokes the possibility
of trade creation and diversion.  From  1995 to  1996, Mexico will export about 20,000 MT
per year to the United States which is below the NAFTA limit of 25,000 MT. In these initial
years, the effects  of NAFTA on the Mexican sugar production are small and do not lead a
production  increase  strong  enough to  fill the allowed  export quota  to the United  States.
Beginning in  1997, NAFTA impacts on Mexico's  sugar production will be more effective
and Mexico will be able to export 25,000 MT per year, the maximum allowed for the first
six years of NAFTA. A similar development occurs during the second part of the transition
period  when the export quota for Mexico is raised to 250,000 MT. From the year 2000 to
2004, Mexico's sugar production will increase slowly, but Mexico will not be able to fill the
quota. By 2005, Mexico's  sugar production should be large enough to fill the quota, which
will result in exports to the United States by 250,000 MT, the maximum allowed per year
for the second part of the transition period.
NAFTA has a small influence on the U.S. sugarcane and sugarbeet areas which decrease
by an average of about 0.02 and 0.7% per year, respectively, compared to the baseline areas.
The decline in cane and beet area causes a decrease  in total domestic  sugar production of
about  1% per year below the baseline estimates. This decrease  in production arises from
trade creation,  that is, Mexico's  imports  displace U.S.  production.  This trade creation  is
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caused by a decline  in the price which arises because the United States as a large country
can depress the world price by shifting its imports from other quota holders to Mexico. The
decrease  in U.S. production and trade creation are smaller in the initial years (an average of
about 10,220 MT in 1994 -97)  but larger towards the end (an average of about 143,600 MT
in 2004-07) of the NAFTA transition period because Mexican exports to the United States
are lower in the beginning than in the end of the trade liberalization period.
The U.S. sugar demand is projected to increase slightly, as a result of price declines and
income  increases.  This  increase  in  sugar demand  is  about 0.8%  per year higher than  the
baseline demand levels. The increase in demand is met by imports from Mexico and ROW.
The portion of imports  from Mexico  that is used to meet demand  expansion is  also trade
creation, which increases from an average of about 5,940 MT in 1994-97 to 98,670 MT in
2004-  07.10  The total trade creation  from production contraction  and demand  expansion,
which averages about 115,940 MT per year, is plotted in figure 5.
Next, the trade diversion of U.S.  imports from ROW to Mexico is  examined. Between
1994 and 1996, Mexico's exports to the United States increase by an average of about 15,897
MT per year, which is below the allowed quota limit. But in  1997, Mexico is able to export
25,000 MT, the maximum amount for the first six years of NAFTA. In 1996 and 1997, since
the U. S. imports are partly supplied by Mexico, the United States reduces its imports from
other quota holders by 5,690 MT in 1996 and 4,750 MT in  1997. These decreases in exports
to the United States by other exporters are the consequences of  the trade diversion from other
exporters  to Mexico  resulting  from  the NAFTA trade preference  provided  by  the United
States to Mexico  (fig. 5).
In  1998 and 1999 Mexico continues to export to the United States the allowable limit of
25,000 MT. However, in these years the U.S domestic demand is strong enough to warrant
additional import increases from other exporters. Consequently, the United States increases
its imports from other exporters by about 60,810 MT in 1998 and 108,480 MT in 1999 above
the baseline levels. In these two years, trade diversion from other exporters to Mexico does
not occur, but trade creation  resulting from the demand  expansion and production decline
does.
After the sixth year of the transition  period, that is, beginning year 2000, the Mexican
export quota is increased to 250,000 MT. Responding to this higher quota and coupled with
increased production efficiency resulting from NAFTA, Mexico is able to increase its exports
modestly  in the years 2000 to 2007. From 2000 to 2004, Mexico's net exports increase from
56,910 MT to 236,210  MT, which  are below the NAFTA provision's  allowable  limit. By
2005,  Mexico will export 250,000  MT to the United States, the maximum amount for the
second  part of the transition period.  As the  United States  gets some of its  imports  from
Mexico  in these years,  the need to  import from  other exporters  decreases.  Consequently,
other  U.S.  quota  holders'  exports  to  the  United  States  decrease  in these  later years.  In
particular,  other countries'  exports to the United States are reduced by 9,460 MT  in 2002;
24,100 MT in 2003; 23,880 MT in 2004; and 5,500 MT in 2005. These reductions in imports
from  other countries  are diverted to Mexico  which increases  its  market share of the U.S.
sugar  market  under  NAFTA.  The  trade  diversion  effects  in  these  later  years  are  more
pronounced  than those  in  1996  and  1997 because  Mexico's  export quota  is higher  in the
second part of the transition period.
'Ilmports  from  other  foreign  suppliers  used to  fulfill  the U.S.  demand can  also be  included  in computing  trade creation.
However;  to  isolate the effects  of Mexican  imports,  we  report only the portion of imports from  Mexico as part of the trade
creation arising from the demand expansion.
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Figure 5.  Trade creation and diversion of U.S.  imports from Mexico
In years  2006 and 2007, trade diversion does not occur because U.S. demand  increases
in these years,  and Mexico cannot increase  its exports under NAFTA beyond the allowable
limit of 250,000 MT. Consequently, the United States has to increase its imports from other
exporters  to  meet its  domestic  demand  in these  two  years.  Because  of the expansion  in
demand, trade creation of 110,250 MT in 2006 and 91,920 MT in 2007 occurs.  It should be
noted  that Mexico's  exports  to the United States do not fully eliminate  U.S. imports  from
other exporting countries, implying that trade diversion is not complete.
Conclusions
NAFTA increases Mexican sugar production as a result of the availability of improved U.S.
technology, new investments, and lower-priced inputs. Higher production allows Mexico to
increase its total exports and to become a net exporter beginning in  1995.
Because  of NAFTA's preferential  treatment,  Mexico  will  export  sugar to the  United
States,  which  results  in  trade  creation  and  diversion of U.S.  imports  from  other foreign
suppliers  to Mexico.  However,  the volume  of trade  creation and  diversion  are relatively
small. Consequently, the effects of NAFTA on the U.S. sugar market are also relatively small
because  of the  side  agreement  provisions  which  limit  the  amount  of Mexico's  exports
particularly  in the second  half of the  transition  period and  includes  HFCS  as  a demand
component in computing Mexico's  net exportable  surplus. If this  side agreement  had not
been  negotiated,  the effects  of NAFTA on the U.S.  sugar market  would have been  more
pronounced.  Finally, the potential  gainers from NAFTA  sugar trade reforms are Mexican
producers, the U.S. HFCS  industry, and U.S.  sugar consumers.  The  losers are other U.S.
foreign suppliers. U.S. producers are also affected because of production declines; however,
these declines are very small.
[Received November 1994; final version received July 1995.]
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